Did the news move before the incident? An exploratory note
Companion to the incident study inc-20261015 (published at
/publications/incident-study-inc-20261015/).
Written 10 November 2026; published on this site as a working document on 12 November 2026.
Status: exploratory, not part of the study's frozen method.
Why this note exists
The incident study follows each incident from 14 days before to 45 days after. It was built to measure reach, spread and speed after an incident. It was not built to ask whether the news was already moving before it.
This note asks that question for five incidents: the four coups and the killings in the Kidal region on 17 February 2025 (listed in the study as the Tiskadene attack). It looks 60 days back instead of 14.
What was done
- All Telegram posts in the corpus from day −60 to day −1 were exported for each of the five incidents (139,180 posts in total).
- The study's own frozen keyword rule and frozen search terms were applied to them, unchanged. For days −14 to −1 the result is identical to the study's own keyword hits (18 of 18, 7 of 7, 21 of 21, 3 of 3, 0 of 0).
- Every hit (115 posts) was read and put in one of four classes:
- lead-up: about the developing crisis or military build-up before the incident;
- event onset: the 23 January 2022 mutiny, one day before the dated coup;
- context: same actors or place, but not pointing to the incident;
- noise: a false keyword hit.
The classes were assigned by one reader, an AI assistant (Claude), once, knowing the outcome. They were not blind and not double-coded. The class given to every post is recorded, so the reading can be checked or overturned; see "Material" below.
Result in one table
| Incident | Posts in 60 days | Keyword hits | Lead-up | Event onset | Context | Noise | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Burkina Faso coup, 24 Jan 2022 | 13,906 | 44 | 19 | 7 | 9 | 9 | Two-month lead-up |
| Kidal region (army and Russian forces against civilians), 17 Feb 2025 | 45,719 | 28 | 23 | – | 1 | 4 | Sharp rise in the last 11 days |
| Burkina Faso coup, 30 Sep 2022 | 34,820 | 24 | 4 | – | 13 | 7 | No build-up |
| Mali coup, 24 May 2021 | 7,724 | 17 | 3 | – | 10 | 4 | No build-up |
| Niger coup, 26 Jul 2023 | 37,011 | 2 | 0 | – | 2 | 0 | No warning at all |
Burkina Faso, January 2022: a two-month lead-up
Lead-up posts per week (day 0 = 24 January 2022):
| Days | Dates | Keyword hits | Lead-up | What the lead-up posts report |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| −60 to −54 | 25 Nov – 1 Dec | 8 | 8 | Calls for President Kaboré to resign; the 27 November march broken up with tear gas; gendarmerie commanders dismissed |
| −53 to −47 | 2 – 8 Dec | 3 | 0 | |
| −46 to −40 | 9 – 15 Dec | 6 | 3 | The government resigns; a new prime minister is named; organisers of the march are arrested |
| −39 to −33 | 16 – 22 Dec | 3 | 1 | Thirteen new military commanders appointed |
| −32 to −26 | 23 – 29 Dec | 2 | 1 | "The president's resignation is still on the table" |
| −25 to −19 | 30 Dec – 5 Jan | 2 | 1 | "Resignation is non-negotiable" |
| −18 to −12 | 6 – 12 Jan | 4 | 2 | Eight soldiers arrested for an alleged coup plot |
| −11 to −5 | 13 – 19 Jan | 4 | 1 | The alleged plot leader is sent to prison |
| −4 to −1 | 20 – 23 Jan | 12 | 2 (+7 onset) | The banned 22 January march; then the 23 January mutiny |
Three things to note:
- The first wave is at the edge of the 60 days. The protests began in mid-November 2021, so the lead-up is longer than this note can show.
- Who carried it. The 19 lead-up posts come from five channels: one Arabic-language news channel (8 posts, 620 to 920 stored views each), three Burkinabè news channels (9 posts, 20 to 300 views) and one French-language channel from the attributed group (2 posts, under 100 views). Among the keyword hits, the large Russian-language channels (3,000 to 27,000 views) appear only on 23 January, the day of the mutiny.
- The dating matters. The study dates the coup to 24 January, the day it was announced. The seven "event onset" posts are from the day before and report the mutiny itself. They are not advance warning.
Kidal region, February 2025: a sharp rise in the last 11 days
The incident: 28 civilians killed in the Kidal region on 17 February 2025 (UCDP: Government of Mali and Government of Russia against civilians).
- Days −60 to −12 (seven weeks): 7 hits in 37,962 posts, or 0.018 %.
- Days −11 to −1: 21 hits in 7,757 posts, or 0.27 %. That is about 15 times the earlier rate. Twenty of the 21 fall in the last six days.
What the posts report, in order: army drone strikes near the Algerian border (24 December); air strikes including Tessalit (27–30 December); a Russian-language channel predicting a Tuareg offensive for 17 January (26,299 views); a drone intercepted at Tessalit airport and a rumour of a downed army helicopter (11 February); an army and Russian operation against a camp near Tessalit (13 February); the killing of a local armed-group leader (14 February).
The 23 lead-up posts come from 14 channels in French, Russian, Arabic and English, with 500 to 26,000 stored views each.
Two limits apply to this case.
- These posts are about military operations in the same sector by the same forces. None of them is about the killing of civilians. They show a build-up around the incident, not news of it.
- The published study flags this incident as unreliable (accuracy 0.04), for the same reason: most of what the search finds is about the operations, not the incident.
The three incidents with no build-up
- Burkina Faso, September 2022. Most hits are routine coverage of the transitional president's foreign visits. Four posts point to trouble: the defence minister dismissed after a run of attacks (reported 13 September), one hostile post about the president (20 September), and two on the protests in Bobo-Dioulasso demanding his resignation (29 September).
- Mali, May 2021. Hits stay flat at 0 to 4 a week. Only three posts point to the coup: the government's resignation and the talks on a new one (14–20 May), all from one Arabic-language channel. The corpus had 14 active channels at the time.
- Niger, July 2023. Two hits in 37,011 posts, both routine news (a regional official's visit, European military aid). This is the clean negative case: by this measure the coup came with no warning.
What the keyword rule misses
The search terms were written to find the incident itself: the capital, the president, the word "coup". A post about the lead-up that names only the country does not match. One example, found by hand: a Russian-language post of 29 November 2021 on the Burkina Faso protests and the demand for the president's resignation (3,739 views). It is not among the 44 hits.
So the lead-up counts in this note are a lower bound, and statements about which channels appear when hold only for the posts the rule finds.
The "our forecast came true" claims
On 23 January 2022 four Russian-language channels wrote, in three different texts, that they had foreseen the coup. The 60-day export was searched for those forecasts.
- Found: one post of 31 December 2021, "Juntas are coming back!" (8,342 views). It asks whether 2022 will bring a domino of coups. It names the Sahel as a region, and lists Cameroon, Togo, Côte d'Ivoire, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon and Senegal. It does not name Burkina Faso.
- Not found: the "January forecast" cited by the largest channel (its post links to a blog outside Telegram), and the earlier post another channel refers to ("we wrote before that the country is closer than ever to a coup"; two channels carried this same text).
What this note can and cannot support
It can support:
- For the January 2022 coup in Burkina Faso, the corpus carried a visible, sustained political crisis for at least two months before the coup.
- For the Kidal region in February 2025, posts about military activity in the sector rose sharply in the 11 days before the killings.
- For the Niger coup of July 2023, the corpus carried nothing in advance.
It cannot support:
- Any claim that the news predicted an incident. Lead-up coverage of a crisis is not a forecast of its outcome.
- Any general rule. Five incidents were examined, chosen after the study's results were known. The 11 other incidents were not searched back to 60 days; in the study's 14-day window they show nothing usable.
- Any comparison of reach. View counts here are those stored when the post was collected, not re-fetched as in the study.
- Anything about the web. The material is Telegram only.
Material
The note rests on the public Telegram messages of the followed channels (the messages dataset on this site) and on the study's frozen search terms. The list of the 115 keyword hits with the class given to each names individual channels. Like the study's per-channel files, it is held back until channel naming is confirmed, and is available to researchers on request through the address on the About page.
Inputs: the study's frozen search terms (sha256 462c3254…), the study's
keyword matcher, pipeline version 0.1.0. The study's own results and its
published pages were not changed by this note.